๐—” ๐Ÿญ๐Ÿต๐Ÿต๐Ÿต ๐— ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ณ๐˜ ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ผ ๐—ฝ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜„ (๐—”๐—œ) ๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐˜€ ๐˜„๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—น๐—ฑ ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐˜๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฌ๐Ÿฎ๐Ÿฒ. ๐—œ๐˜ ๐—ท๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ป’๐˜ ๐—ธ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜„ ๐—ถ๐˜ ๐˜†๐—ฒ๐˜.

Back in ’99, an engineer named Loren Kohnfelder wrote up “The Threats To Our Products” and gave security teams an acronymโ€”STRIDEโ€”we’ve leaned on ever since.

Almost thirty years later, AI agents are reading inboxes, running code, and calling APIs on our behalf. And STRIDE fits them almost uncomfortably well.
I don’t think that’s luck. Kohnfelder was pointing at something underneath the tech!
How trust moves between systems. Agents might be the messiest trust problem we’ve ever shipped.

๐—›๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ’๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐˜„๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ธ, ๐—ฎ๐—ฝ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐˜€:
๐—ฆ โ€” ๐—ฆ๐—ฝ๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—ณ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด. Prompt injection. An attacker hides instructions in a doc or email the agent reads, dressed up to look like they came from you. The agent obeys, because it can’t always tell your instructions from theirs. (OWASP ranks this #1 for LLM apps.)

๐—ง โ€” ๐—ง๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด. Poisoned dataโ€”either in training or in a compromised API the agent trusts. Goes in upstream, shows up downstream in production.

๐—ฅ โ€” ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐˜‚๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป. An agent fires off a purchase or edits a file autonomously, and the audit trail is patchy or missing. Something breaks and nobody can prove what happened. Accountability quietly evaporates.

๐—œ โ€” ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐——๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ฐ๐—น๐—ผ๐˜€๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฒ. Models can cough up training data when prompted right. And a long-running agent piling up context can be nudged into leaking it.

๐—— โ€” ๐——๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ฆ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ. Inference costs real money. Force an agent into a loop and you get both downtime and an ugly cloud bill. MITRE ATLAS calls it “Cost Harvesting.”

๐—˜ โ€” ๐—˜๐—น๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ฒ. Agents get broad permissions to stay useful. A prompt injection can ride those permissions and do anything the deploying user could. Most agents in production are wildly over-privileged.

The threats aren’t a new shape. They’re just harder to spot, because agents behave probabilistically. You can’t read the source and point at the bugโ€”you have to poke the thing and see what falls out.
That’s exactly why the old frameworks earn their keep: they hand you the right questions even when the system’s a black box.

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